Understanding scientific explanation is an enduring task for philosophers and historians of science. Despite early attempts to unify scientific explanation, it is now largely recognized that the historical sciences-- a diverse group that (arguably) includes archaeology, paleontology, evolutionary biology, cosmology, and/or climate science-- may appeal to different patterns of explanation than the experimental sciences. Beyond explanation, the historical sciences and experimental sciences may also differ in how they make predictions, model data, gather and analyze evidence, confirm theories, and incorporate values. The methodological differences between historical and experimental science may motivate pluralism with respect to scientific method and justification. But it has also been argued that these differences reflect the limitations of the historical sciences. These limitations could stem from an inability to intervene on their subject matter experimentally, a difficulty in reaching universal laws, and/or a focus on singular events in the deep past. To further explore these issues, the graduate students of the University of Notre Dame’s History and Philosophy of Science Ph.D. program, administered by the John J. Reilly Center for Science, Technology, and Values, will convene atwo day conference for the purposes of exploring questions concerning reasoning in the historical sciences.