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The GAMM Annual Meeting 2026 will be hosted by the Universität Stuttgart

Infinitesimalrechnung, Differentialgleichungen, Integralrechnung,    Analysis

The conference focuses on recent developments in applied mathematics. Topics will include challenges from materials and fluids, singular stochastic models, homogenization, optimal transport and regularity theory. The conference seeks to create interaction at the interface of these fields bringing together international experts and junior scientists.

The Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics (HIM)

This school features talks on topics in mechanism design theory of recent interest. The emphasis is on topics closely related to the program's core objectives. Participation in the school prepares attendees for researching current questions in mechanism design.

The Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics (HIM)

Mechanism design without transfers considers the case when outcomes are allocations of objects to agents and do not involve monetary transfers between the agents. There are various legal, ethical, or practical reasons motivating this restriction. The absence of transfers limits the extent to which mechanism design goals can be achieved. The literature thus focuses on proving the existence of and constructing allocations with economically desirable properties rather than incentive-compatible mechanisms implementing those. Indeed, such mechanisms often fail to exist. Recently, this line of work has been picked up by theoretical computer scientists since it gives rise to various computational questions. This workshop focuses on fair division, matching, and other allocation problems without transfers.

This workshop is directed at the participants in the Trimester Program "Advances in Mechanism Design". It is not possible to apply only for this workshop.

The Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics (HIM)

The workshop brings together research at the intersection of mechanism design and information design. Traditionally, mechanism design studies the design of optimal institutions, taking the information structure as given, whereas information design studies the design of optimal information structures, within a given institution. Recent applications have highlighted the importance of jointly determining mechanisms together with how information is used by the mechanism (e.g., limited commitment, aftermarkets, robust mechanism design) and how the tools of information/mechanism design can be used to answer questions of mechanism/information design (e.g., delegation). The goal of the workshop is to introduce participants to this new frontier of design by showcasing the latest research in the area.

This workshop is directed at the participants in the Trimester Program "Advances in Mechanism Design". It is not possible to apply only for this workshop.

The Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics (HIM)

The outcome of a mechanism is, from the perspective of an agent, uncertain ex-ante since the other agents’ types are unknown or the mechanism itself randomizes over outcomes. Most work on mechanism design assumes that agents maximize their expected utility when faced with uncertainty. There is, however, strong empirical evidence that expected utility theory does not explain agents’ behavior in common mechanism design settings well. This workshop aims to promote a more general theory for mechanism design without the expected utility hypothesis by combining the expertise on decision-making under uncertainty in the decision theory community with methods from mechanism design.